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HOME MORTGAGE LENDERS AND EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS
Risa Palm
Department of Geography Universe of Colorado, Boulder. Colorado 80309
ABSTRACT: A survey of major home mortgage lenders and real -property
appraisers in California and the Puget Sound region shows a general inattention to
earthquake hazards in appraisal and lending policy. This inattention is
demonstrated not only in responses to survey questions, but also in a lack of
differentiation in lending decisions between properties within and outside surfacefault rupture zones. As posited by organizational theory however, important
variants exist in this overall policy, almost always resulting from the efforts of
individuals within large lending organizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, few homeowners are insured for earthquake-related damage. As a result,
homeowners in earthquake-prone areas are particularly susceptible to serious financial losses. In
California, for example, less than 10 percent of the homeowners are insured for earthquakerelated damage (Kunreuther et al. 1978; Palm 1981a; Steinbrugge 1982; Turner et al. 1979).
Most of the homeowners' equity in such property, which is frequently the major source of
savings for the individual household, could thus be lost in a single major event.
Contrary to popularly held views, all of California is not equally susceptible to seismic-related
damage. Even within individual metropolitan areas, it has been possible to develop
microzonation maps to show regions likely to experience "no significant damage" in contrast to
those likely to experience “extremely strong shock with partial or total destruction of some
buildings” or “high ground water with high potential for ground failure (liquifaction)” (Figure 1).
Such information could be made available to prospective home buyers in some systematic
fashion or could be contained “in the market,” in the sense that housing in more hazardous would
carry a lower price. Neither of these conditions, however, obtain at present. Although the
Alquist-Priolo legislation in California requires real estate agents to inform home buyers if a
property is within a surface-fault rupture zone (a “special studies zone”), this disclosure has been
shown to be ineffective as a means of transmitting environmental information (Palm 1981a).
Furthermore, house prices do not reflect location in such zones (Palm 198lb). Finally, the special
studies zones themselves never were intended to approximate the area particularly liable to
earthquake damage; because they are based solely on distance from a surface-fault trace and do
not take into account bedrock conditions, areas susceptible to liquifaction and ground failure are
excluded.·

FIGURE 1. Microzonation of Earthquake Hazards
The purchase of housing takes place in a highly credit-dependent environment: most housing
involves some form of mortgage financing, and, as a result, the willingness of the mortgage
lender to grant a loan on favorable terms has a major influence on the purchase decision. What
this means is that the lender has a major impact on the maximum price that can be obtained on a
property. Although the actual final price is the product of “the market,” in which a buyer and
seller reach an agreement, some consensus among appraisers and lenders about the market value
of a class of housing affects the price range within which final negotiations take place. Thus, the
ways in which home mortgage lenders estimate property value and make loan approvals set
major limitations to individual locational decision making by prospective home buyers.

The purpose of the research reported here was to study the responses of home mortgage lenders
and real property appraisers to earthquake hazards. The study was designed to describe the
practices of lenders and appraisers in incorporating earthquake hazards in their portfolio analysis
and lending behavior. Its other purpose was to explore the applicability of recent organizational
theory to an empirical setting in which individuals in very large organizations must respond to a
highly complex and ambiguous environmental situation.
2. DECISION MAKING BY LENDERS AND APPRAISERS
The valuation of property by real-estate appraisers and the decision to grant or deny a loan
application by home mortgage lenders are conceptualized as highly rational processes.
Investment in a particular set of locations can be seen as comparable to the so-called “locational
rationalization” process used to describe the behavior of multilocational or multinational
corporations (Clarke 1 982; Taylor and Thrift 1981). In this system of analysis, operations are
continuously checked against one another for relative profitability, and capital is moved rapidly
to the most profitable locations (Clarke 1982; Taylor and Thrift 1981). The financial and
operational performance of firms can be monitored, and performance is compared to normative
indices (McConnell 1982).
While the relatively longer-term investment in home mortgage loans is not perfectly captured by
the locational rationalization system, lending and valuation decisions can be understood as part
of an overall investment strategy. Further- more, valuation procedures and loan decision-making
skills are frequently taught in university courses and described in textbooks (Bloom and Harrison
1978). These idealized decision models can be used as a standard against which the actual
behavior of appraisers and lenders can be measured.
Models of Appraiser Behavior
Real-estate appraisers are taught to use three methods to assess the value of single-family
residences: the market-data or comparable approach, the cost method, and the income approach.
The market-data approach, in which the subject property is compared to “comparable” property
that has recently been sold, is used most commonly for single-family residential property. The
appraisal report for this approach should include information on the house itself; its local
environment, and neighborhood characteristics. In courses in real-estate appraisal, students are
reminded that various hazards may affect the value of the property.
Sometimes hazards exist in the neighborhood that reduce the value of a property.
The most common hazard is heavy traffic, and the market will definitely recognize
and penalize this problem. The awareness of flood hazards has become quite
important in many parts of the country . . . [and the effect of flooding and mandatory
flood insurance] on value must also be considered and reported in the appraisal.
Other hazards that should be investigated include potential slides, earthquakes,
dangerous ravines and bodies of water, or any unusual fire danger
(Bloom and Harrison 1978, pp. 124-25).
There are two significant points in this quotation; first, the notion that it is not the appraiser who
is taking an active role in valuation, but rather, “the market,” which in this text is reified to

enable it to “recognize” and “penalize” a problem; and second, the admonishment to take
flooding and other natural hazards into account in the appraisal.
Although appraisers may include descriptions of any number of variables in their reports, the
final estimated value they report is based on probable market activity-the agreement reached
between a seller and a buyer. In some ways, then, the appraiser simply reflects the workings of
the market in attempting to estimate the probable selling price. In other ways, however, the
appraiser influences the market, insofar as appraisal reports are used to make decisions
concerning the amount of mortgage financing to be made available. The influence of appraisers
is conservative: the appraisal report reflects past market behavior that, in the process of being
reported and estimated for the current transaction, influences present financing decisions as well
as perceptions of current market value.
Home Mortgage Lending Practices
Ideally, lending decisions are made in two steps. The first is a general portfolio analysis,
including a decision about what percentage of assets to invest in housing. This decision is made
in response to regulatory and tax constraints, liquidity needs, and the computation of the current
ratio of profit-to-risk in residential loans. The second decision is made by loan officers or loan
committees concerning particular applications for financing. Two factors are considered:
characteristics of the borrower (the likelihood that the borrower will repay the loan in a timely
fashion), and characteristics of the security property (the likelihood that in the event of a
foreclosure, the costs of foreclosure and the balance of the loan outstanding will be covered).
Studies have also shown that lending decisions are affected by the risk-taking inclinations of the
loan officer, the perceived career advantage of particular risk-taking strategies (Schweig 1977),
the dynamics of the decision-making process in the loan committee (Chalos 1982), and the
previous relationship between the borrower and the loan officer.
The rational decision-making model posits that lenders formulate an expected profit function
which is used to evaluate any given loan application. For example, Shear and Yezer (1983)
conceptualized a rational decision-making model:
E(π) = Λ(1 + r)L + (1 – Λ) ΟV – (1 + i) L
Where
E(π)

=

expected profit

Λ

=

expected probability of borrower not defaulting

R

=

mortgage interest rate

L

=

mortgage amount

Ο

=

share of house value not captured by collection costs when default occurs

V

=

expected value of house conditional on foreclosure occurring

I

=

opportunity cost of capital

Expected profit from a mortgage loan is equal to revenue from the loan (based on interest rate
and resale value in the event of a default) minus the cost of making the loan (what the capital
could return to the investor if placed in alternative investments). The mortgage's interest rate
should be higher if the loan officer's perception of the possibility of default is higher, if
opportunity costs are higher, or if collection costs when a default occurs are higher. The lender
integrates earthquake hazards through a calculation of the probability that an earthquake will
occur which will cause the loan to go into default, or that earthquake damage will impair the
ability of the lender to recoup the investment in the event of a default. On this point, empirical
evidence (Anderson and Weinrode 1981) suggests that moderate-intensity earthquakes have
induced fairly high foreclosure and delinquency rates.
This study posited that if lenders feared major potential financial losses associated with
foreclosure proceedings or, in a period of weak or declining house values, anticipated negative
net equities in the event of a major earthquake, then they might take measures to ensure the
safety of their mortgage investments. It should be noted that even if only a few lenders refuse to
grant conventional loans, require higher down payments, or require the purchase of earthquake
insurance in areas particularly susceptible to seismic-related damage, the result would be some
reduction in the flow of mortgage funds and a relatively higher cost of obtaining mortgage
financing, thereby depressing property values.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY
In the preceding discussion, a model of decision making and valuation by appraisers and lenders
was presented which was based largely on “rational” calculations. Little consideration was given
to the fact that organizations, including major lending institutions, are complex, inconsistent, and
constantly changing. Decision theory that ignores such circumstances is clearly insufficient to
capture the complexity involved in the actual valuation of hazards and the integration of this
valuation in lending behavior. It is important, therefore, to review those aspects of organization
theory that contribute to the understanding of' the response of lending institutions to uncertainty
in the physical environment.
Recent work in organizational theory has diverged from the classic models describing
communication and decision making within large organizations (Putnam 1982). Putnam and
Cheney (1985) have concluded that recent studies of organizational communication have
emphasized the ways in which meaning is created. Organizations are seen increasingly as simple
aggregates of persons arranged in patterned relationships, rather than as formal and permanent
structures. In addition, more attention has been paid to intraorganizational conflict in studies
focusing on resource control or power, and the influence of “gatekeepers” on decision making
(DuBrin 1972; Kanter 1977).
Thompson (1983) has argued that the objectives of firms are often ambiguous and contradictory.
In the firm, there are conflicting interests, continuing negotiations, and alliances continuously
being renegotiated, reformed, and dissolved. The organizational management “charts an always
compromised course through an always changing series of constraints and obstacles where an

always shifting series of partial objectives are in play in that negotiation” (Thompson 1983, p.
237). Similar arguments have been made by Salaman (1978) and Heydebrand (1977).
Another perspective has been provided by communication theorists influenced by an
anthropological approach to organizations (Pacanowsky and O'Donnel-Trujillo 1982). This line
of argument promotes attention to “organizational culture.” Within this framework, studies
would focus on the use of “relevant constructs” (shared vocabulary which indicates the ways in
which individuals affiliated with the organization structure their experiences), “facts” (shared
social knowledge within the organization), “practices” (methods of performing particular
functions), “metaphors'' (specific phrases or symbols used to structure the reality of the
organization), “stories” (narratives about real and ideal organizational life), and “rites and
rituals” to orient and share reality with other organizational members.
Recent sociological approaches have stressed a historical perspective. Bensen (1977) has argued
for increased attention to the historical process from which present-day organizational patterns
have been generated and through which relationships are sustained. Similarly, Giddens (1979,
1984) and Abrams (1982) have called for an increased emphasis on the evolution of the
organization within broader societal structures; the organization continually emerges as a
function the influence of individuals as well as structure.
Regional science has also concerned itself with these theoretical perspectives. Two presidential
addresses to the Regional Science Association, by Torsten Hägerstrand (1970) and Allan Pred
(1985), have pointed up the importance of the investigation of human agency embedded in a
complex organizational structure. In Pred's paper, explicit attention was given to the importance
of studying the ways in which situated individuals affect the development of structure -- how
human agency produces and maintains places and regions.
A continuing theme in this literature the necessity to focus on diversity within organizational
structures, as well as on the specific historic circumstances which have contributed to current
organizational structure and practice. When studying the response of financial institutions to the
physical environment, diversity of responses within a single industry should he monitored. This
would elicit an understanding of conflicts within individual institutions, of their resolution in
particular cases, and of the influence on overall organizational policy of individuals with varying
professional goals and personal experiences. External constraints to organizational response
should also he included explicitly in the analysis.
Both the rational decision-making models and the frameworks suggested by recent work in
organizational theory were used to formulate hypotheses for the study reported here. It was
hypothesized that the aggregate of lending and appraisal decisions generally follow principles of
rational decision making: that, except where forced to respond to low probability events by other
legislation, lenders rarely consider the unlikely event of major destruction associated with
earthquake in their overall lending decisions, and that little disinvestment occurs in earthquake-

hazard areas. It was also proposed, however, that (1) there are intra-industry variations in this
generalization (significant differences in the ways in which earthquake hazards information is
incorporated and weighted in lending policy); and (2) certain individuals within financial
institutions have had significant impact on the decision to adopt a particular lending policy with
respect to earthquake hazards.
4. THE SURVEY OF APPRAISERS
In order to ascertain the practices and attitudes of real estate appraisers to earthquake hazards, a
survey of 30 California appraisers was conducted between November 1982 and February 1983.
Individuals interviewed were, in all but one case, independent fee-appraisers who were selfemployed or employed by appraisal firm, rather than by a financial institution. All had been
appraisers for more than 10 years, and most of them did single-family house appraisal primarily
for mortgage lenders.
Appraisers were asked how they incorporated information into their property appraisals about a
variety of environmental factors, including, landslide hazards, location in a flood plain, location
on a surface-fault trace, location in a special studies zone, and evidence of damage to the
property from earthquakes or landslides. They were asked if they routinely investigated these
factors, if they noted them in their appraisal reports, if they checked comparable properties for
these factors, and if they identified a price adjustment for each factor (Table 1). Although
appraisers said they almost always investigated whether a property was in a flood plain, only a
minority sought information on whether it was on a surface-fault trace, and only 13 percent made
any price adjustment for this factor. It was exceptional that comparables were checked for
similar hazard conditions, or that any price adjustment was made.
TABLE 1. Appraisals and Environmental Hazards
Percentage of appraisers who:
Investigate
if
condition
applies

Note in
report

Check
comparables

Identify
price
adjustment

Floodplain

93

87

77

23

Special Studies
Zone

67

53

57

17

On surface-fault
trace

37

37

23

13

Landslide area

57

43

43

33

Evidence of
previous damage

63

63

27

17

To elicit another view of the way in which appraisers incorporate earthquake hazards into a
property valuation, they were provided with an example of a typical property and asked to make
an appropriate price adjustment. They were asked to estimate the 1982 price of a “fifteen-year
old, tract or semi-custom house with 1,800 square feet, three bedrooms, and two bathrooms, on a
standard-sized lot in an average middle-income and middle-aged neighborhood in this
community.” The median price estimated by the California appraisers for such a house was
$160,000, with the estimated price ranging from $115,000 to $250,000. When asked, “In your
experience, what range of price reduction have you encountered if the property were in a special
studies zone or surface-fault rupture zone,” most responded that there was no price reduction at
all; the median response was 0.1 percent reduction (Table 2). Most appraisers felt that location in
a landslide-prone area, or evidence of actual damage from previous earthquake-related
movement, would have a negative effect on price, but that the location of a property within a
mapped floodp1ain or special studies zone would not, by itself, lower the price. This perception
is in accord with previous statistical analysis of actual price effects (Palm 1981b).
TABLE 2. Valuation of an “Average House”
Median
estimated
price
reduction

Percentage
of
appraisers
who said
“no
reduction”

0.3%

69.6

. . . is in a landslide-prone area

17.0%

25.0

. . . is in a Special Studies Zone

0.1%

75.0

10.0%

40.0

The house . . .
. . . is in a mapped floodplain

. . . shows evidence of actual
damage from previous earth
movement

Appraisers were asked whether they had ever had a client request information concerning
seismic hazard. Only three of the respondents (10 percent of the sample) said they were
frequently asked about seismic hazards by clients; the others answered that they were rarely or
never asked. Appraisers whose clients asked for seismic information were also more likely to say
that they routinely investigate whether a property is located on a surface-fault trace or landslideprone area, to note this in the appraisal report, and to check comparables for both characteristics.
In general, appraisers behaved as hypothesized. They indicated that earthquakes cannot be
isolated as an influence on value because they occur only infrequently. In addition, the effect on
price is generally small and short-lived.
Appraisers do not feel that earthquake hazards have been incorporated “by the market” into
housing prices and, therefore, generally disregard their potential effect on value. Although there

is individual variability in appraisal practice, most appraisers respond to what they perceive as
the realities of the market.
THE RESPONSE OF LENDERS TO EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS
A survey of chief executive officers (or their designates) was conducted in last three months of
1982 among 90 California lending institutions, and 30 similar institutions in the Puget Sound
Region. The combined assets in home mortgage loans for the Washington sample accounted for
approximately 60 percent of all home mortgages held by commercial banks, savings banks, and
savings and loans in the state; the California sample represented about 75 percent of such assets.
An open -ended question asked lenders to list those characteristics of a property that are
important in their decision to grant a home mortgage loan. Only 37 percent of the responses
included some sort of geophysical hazard, such location in a floodplain, location with respect to
a known earthquake fault, or susceptibility to landslides. When asked more directly whether
seismic risk was considered when evaluating loans on residential property, the vast majority
respondents in both states said that seismic conditions were not considered as a basis for setting
loan conditions. Overall, only 18 lenders, mostly in California, did consider seismic conditions.
The rational lending model suggests that earthquake hazards should be a factor in the lending
decision if lenders believe that large numbers of households would default after a major
damaging earthquake, and if areas particularly susceptible to earthquake damage can be
pinpointed. , Several questions were posed to probe lenders' perceptions of these issues.
First, lenders were asked to rank five possible causes of mortgage default-- unemployment
of the head of household, divorce, fire, major flooding, and major earthquake damage. In
both California and Washington, lenders evaluated a major earthquake as the least likely
cause of mortgage default.
A second perspective was sought with a question designed to elicit the beliefs of lenders
concerning the likely outcomes of a major damaging earthquake. The question provided a
scenario of probable damage following the maximum intensity earthquake likely to occur in the
three areas. Three forms of this question were posed: one for the Puget Sound (based on U.S.
Geological Survey 1975), a second for Northern California (based on Davis et al. 1982a), and a
third for Southern California (based on Davis et al. 1982b). In Southern California, scenario
read:
An earthquake along the southern San Andreas Fault has a high 1ikelihood of
occurrence. An 8.3 event would claim $17 billion in property damage, between
3,000 and 14,000 dead, and between 12,000 and l5, 000 hospitalized, depending
upon the time of day the event occurs.
Lenders in the three regions were then asked to speculate on the likely outcomes such an
earthquake (Table 3). Lenders do expect mortgage defaulting in the event of a major earthquake
and believe that some insurers will be unable to meet their liabilities. When asked what

proportion of their portfolios they expected would he in default, most Washington lenders
indicated only a small percentage (less than 10 percent), but California lenders were more
pessimistic. Almost one-fourth of the California lenders expect more than 25 percent of their
home mortgage portfolios to be in default.
TABLE 3. What Would Be the Likely Results of a Major Earthquake?
Percentage of lenders who said
“yes” or “maybe”
California
sample

Washington
sample

Increased mortgage defaults

98

94

Fire insurance more expensive

76

77

Changes in the building code

75

87

Local recession

71

57

Insurers unable to meet liabilities

53

35

Adequate government aid

41

43

Earthquake insurance unavailable

40

21

State-wide recession

35

30

Fire insurance unavailable

16

10

Market Impacts of Lender Perceptions
The survey research indicates a lack of attention to earthquake hazards. To investigate the market
impact of this attitude to earthquake hazards, loan applications in California were analyzed.
Economic theory would posit that the market should reflect the response of even a minority of
lenders (Brookshire and Schulze 1980, 1982; Rosen 1974): Although explicit incorporation of
earthquake hazards is done by only a minority of lenders, their actions should result in a
weakening of house prices within special studies zones.
To test this hypothesis, data from the California Loan Register Report were analyzed. This
publication contains detailed information on home loan .applications from all California statelicensed savings and loans over the period of 1976 to 1981. The second and third quarters of
1979 and 1980 were selected to draw a sample. This period contained a large number of property
transfers and immediately preceded a very rapid rise in interest rates which weakened the
market.
The specific hypothesis was that the decision to grant a loan would be systematically related to
the ratio of sales price to income, the age of housing, whether the property was owner- or renteroccupied, the race or ethnicity of the borrower and whether or not the census tract in which the
house was located was included in a special studies zone. Variables reflecting the borrower's
credit history, the more detailed attributes of each property and information on the immediately

surrounding neighborhoods also should be included. Such information is not available in the
Loan Register Report; the model, therefore, uses age of housing and proposed tenure status of
the borrower as general indicators of neighborhood quality, and race or ethnicity of the borrower
to control for possible discrimination factors. Weak evidence of discrimination was found by
Schafer and Ladd (1981) and Goebel (1982) in their analyses of the same data set.
Data analysis was conducted for the state as a whole, as well as for smaller housing submarkets.
The statewide calculations were performed to get a very general outline of the characteristics of
lending decisions. Submarket approximations give a more detailed and accurate picture of the
contributions of individual variables to the lending decisions, since it can be argued that various
submarkets operate independently (Straszheim 1974). Ideally, submarket areas should be defined
by patterns of information exchange, an area which is best approximated by Board of Realtors
territories (Bourne 1976; Palm 1976, 1978); counties within SMSAs were used to approximate
Board of Realtors Districts.
For the state as a whole, and for ten counties within the major SMSAs, determinant functions
were calculated, as well as t-tests on the individual variables to determine their relationship to the
lending decision (Table 4). Location in a special studies zone entered only the discriminant
functions for Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara Counties. T-tests on this variable
showed that there was a significant difference between loan applications granted and denied in
special studies zones versus other areas only in Alameda and Riverside Counties. Both of these
cases are interesting because the relationship was exactly the opposite of what would have been
expected: loans on property located in the special studies zones (surface-fault rupture zones)
were more likely to be granted than loans on property located in other areas. The explanation is
not a perverse preference of residents of these counties for earthquake hazards zones; rather, it is
probable that special studies zones do not contribute in any way to the lending decisions, and
other amenities associated with these zones make them attractive to lenders. In Alameda County
the special studies zones are associated with architecturally unique properties in the hills of
Oakland and Berkeley along the Hayward Fault. In Riverside County, the special studies zone
runs through a set of rapidly developing desert communities, including Morongo Valley, Desert
Hot Springs and North Palm Springs. In both cases the special studies zone is in a portion of the
county which is desirable for relatively newer, higher-priced housing, and the zone designation
has not had a negative impact on loan applications.
In the state taken as a whole, and in the urban submarkets approximated by counties within
major SMSAs, only two variables were consistently related to the decision to accept or reject a
home mortgage loan application. First, lenders tended to act more favorably on loan application
for new housing rather than older housing (except in San Francisco County). Second, ethnicity
and race of the borrower had an impact on the lending decision in several of the counties:
Hispanic borrowers were less likely to rece1ve a favorable loan decision in Alameda, Los
Angeles, Riverside, and Santa Clara Counties than were Anglo borrower, and black borrowers
were more likely to receive a negative decision in all but San Bernardino County. The ratio of
sales price to income was related to the lending decisions only in Alameda, Los Angeles, San

Bernardino, and San Francisco Counties, contrary to expectations based on the rational decision
model.
TABLE 4. Statistical Analysis of Home Loan Applications
Sample
State

SP/I

AGE

OWN

BLACK

HISP

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

2

1.2

1.2

SSZ

Counties
Alameda

1.2

Contra Costa

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

2

Los Angeles

1.2

1.2

1

1.2

2

Orange

1.2

1

1.2

1.2

Riverside

1.2

2

San Bernardino

1.2

2

San Francisco

1.2

1.2

1.2

San Mateo

1.2

2

1.2

Santa Clara

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

2

2

1.2

Ventura

2
1.2

1.2
2

2
1.2

2

Symbols
1 = t - value for difference between loans granted and loans refused significant at .05 for this variable
2 = variable entered into the discriminant function

Variable Definitions
SP/I

Ratio of sales price to family income

AGE

Year the house was build

OWN

Owner-occupied housing

BLACK Borrower was black
HISP

Borrower was Hispanic

SSZ

Property was located in a Special Studies Zone

In sum, location in a special studies zone does not seem to have a negative impact on the lending
decision: instead, it has no impact whatsoever. T is finding is not surprising given both the size
and diversity of the special studies zones, and the survey responses of lenders and appraisers.
Both survey data and information on correlates of lending decision provide evidence that
location in a surface-fault rupture zone does not affect the evaluation of that property by
appraisers and lenders. The mere mapping of special studies zones has not resulted in a change
of lender behavior, nor a tendency to avoid investment the zones.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF LENDERS WHO DO CONSIDER SEISMIC RISK
Although the general hypothesis of this research project was that lenders would tend to ignore
the low probability, locationally unspecific earthquake hazard, the subhypothesis was that there
would be intra-industry variation in this response. This variation would be attribuable.to the
organizational structure of lending institutions and the impacts of key individuals within these
institutions. To gain further insights on the behavior of the minority of lenders who do consider
seismic risk in their lending policies, the responses of California lenders to questions about the
incorporation of seismic risk in lending decisions were cross tabulated with other portions of the
questionnaire. This tabulation revealed that California lenders who considered seismic risk in
residential loans were also more likely to consider seismic risk when evaluating loans on
commercial property; were more likely to require earthquake insurance when there was evidence
of previous seismic or geologic damage; were more likely to favor lender-required earthquake
insurance as an industry-wide policy; were more favorable to instituting earthquake insurance
requirements if the cost of such insurance could be reduced; were more likely to require
earthquake insurance for property located within a special studies zone; were more likely to
refuse loans because of location within a special studies zone or a landslide-prone area or
because of evidence of previous damage to the dwelling unit from seismic or geological activity;
were more likely to state that it is the lender's responsibility to inform home buyers about
earthquake hazards; and were more likely to use geologic or other scientific information in their
lending decisions. They were also less likely than other lenders to expect government aid to be
adequate to reimburse homeowners for their disaster losses following a major earthquake.
Discriminant functions corroborated these simple cross tabulations. Coefficients were calculated
from a stepwise procedure using Wilks’ lambda criterion (Rao 1973).The variables entering into
the function are shown in the first column of Table 5. These variables correctly classify 83.9
percent of the grouped lenders.
The responses of California lenders who said they required earthquakes insurance for loans on
property underlain by a surface-fault trace were similarly classified. Of 62 California lenders, 12
indicated that they have such requirements. The variables shown on the right in Table 5 correctly
classify 88.6 percent of lenders grouped in this way.
To gain further insights into the history of the development of an earthquake-sensitive lending
policy among the minority of institutions which explicitly considered seismic hazard, a second
round of interviews was conducted in the early months of 1984 at institutions that (1) had a
policy incorporating seismic risk in residential lending and (2) had a written document outlining
this policy. Ten of the 90 institutions contacted in the first round of interviews were included,
representing about 18 percent of the total California residential loan portfolio held by the
combination of all commercial banks and savings and loan institutions as of 1981.
The sequence of events that permitted a change in lending policy varied among the institutions.
Some responded to losses from previous earthquake; such as the 1971 Sylmar/San Francisco
earthquake; others said that the Community Reinvestment Act or the Federal Flood Insurance

Program encouraged lenders to reevaluate their entire lending policy; and still others indicated
educational seminars influenced them to consider such a policy. Although hazard mitigation
policies resulted from various sequences of events, in all cases, one person had been responsible
for instituting and promoting a lending policy sensitive to seismic risk. In most of the institutions
this individual was a high ranking executive (the president, chief executive officer, or member of
the board of directors), although in a few cases the individual was a residential loan officer.
In sum, lenders generally behaved as hypothesized. Overall, lenders ignore low-probability
earthquake hazard, despite a recognition of its potentially disastrous effect on the economic wellbeing of the institution. In the minority of cases where lending policy has adjusted to the
presence of earthquake hazards, it was the efforts of a single individual motivated by specific
circumstances that effected the institution’s response.
TABLE 5. Characteristics of Lenders Who Consider Earthquake Hazards
Lenders Including Seismic Risk
in Loan Policy
Variable Entering
Canonical
Discriminant
Function

Standardized
Coefficient*

Lenders Requiring Earthquake
Insurance for Property on a
Surface-Fault Trace
Variable Entering
Canonical
Discriminant
Function

Standardized
Coefficient*

Lender’s
responsibility to
inform buyers of
hazards

.55

Percentage of loans
that would be in
default

.64

Commercial bank
(vs. S and L)

.55

Consider seismic
risk on personal
residence

.58

Consider seismic
hazard on personal
residence

.51

Lender’s
responsibility to
inform buyers of
hazards

.53

Have earthquake
insurance on
personal residence

.40

Rank earthquake as
cause of default

.51

Have attended
earthquake seminar

.31

Location in San
Francisco

.36

Years as a loan
officer
Percentage of
loans that would
be in default

−.29

.21

Volume vs. safety
as criteria of
success as lender
Have attended
earthquake seminar

−.36

.22

*Wilks' Lambda for all coefficients significant beyond the .01 confidence
level

7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has shown that, in the aggregate, home mortgage lenders and real-property appraisers
respond only passively to earthquake hazards. Most lenders do not believe that a major damaging
earthquake is a likely cause of large-scale defaulting. They cite several justifications for this
belief. First, at present, earthquakes cannot be precisely predicted either in time or location.
Second, they believe that even in the event of a major earthquake, their portfolios are relatively
insulated from major losses -- large homeowner equity would insure the lenders of an eventual
continuation of mortgage repayments. Third, they feel that other events, including unanticipated
unemployment of principle wage earners, or dissolution of the family, are far more likely to
impair repayment of mortgage loans. Lenders are, therefore, responding to a low-probability
event in a way they see as rational: they accept the small risk of loss that might accompany a
major damaging earthquake. Lenders depend on “the market” to help them with lending
decisions, except when actually forced by legislation or regulation to heed low-probability
natural hazards.
A significant exception to this overall conclusion is the finding that nine major home mortgage
lenders, with combined residential loan portfolios accounting for 18 percent of loans held by
California savings and loans and commercial banks, do have written statements incorporating
earthquake hazards into residential lending policies. In every case, these institutions adopted
such evaluation procedures as the result of the influence of a particular individual. In some cases,
this person had been influenced by state or federally supported earthquake education seminars, or
by experience in dealing with the impairment of mortgage repayment associated with previous
earthquakes. This finding should be noted by agencies that have sponsored earthquake education
seminars for corporate officers, such as the California Seismic Safety Commission, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Geological Survey, since it indicates that their
efforts have borne some fruit. Another important finding is that those lenders who explicitly
consider earthquake hazards do not feel that such stipulations have, in any way, resulted in a
decline of loan applications or lost business. On the contrary, lenders testified that they gained
increased security in their own portfolios, as well as the thanks of loan applicants for informing
them about the need to reduce the susceptibility of the household to equity losses.
The study also demonstrates the ways in which structuring theory can provide a framework for
better understanding the response to a complex, ever- changing environment. Theories of
organizational communication point up the significance of individual influence in corporate
policy, and the extent to which variability can exist within a single institution. Structuring theory
calls attention to the combination of the influence of individuals (agents) and structural
constraints in placing individuals and aggregates of individuals in a particular action context. In
the case of lending institutions, the primary environmental constraint is not that of the
geophysical setting, but rather the shorter-term set of economic conditions, state and federal
banking regulations, and competitive strategies adopted by other similar institutions. Attention to
these constraints permits a better understanding of the seeming non-response of lenders to
serious environmental hazards.

The synthesis of theoretical perspectives suggested in structuration theory (Giddens 1984)
permits and promotes a more revealing analysis of a highly complex human-environmental
situation. It is from such an approach that insights into the nature of the human-environmental
system may be obtained, and strategies for intervention and mitigation may best be formulated.
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